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Shol Blustein  
 
FROM THE BOTTOM-UP:  
REDESIGNING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSE TO ANTHROPOGENIC 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The design of the Kyoto Protocol renders it incapable of effectively 
responding to the problem of anthropogenic climate change.  Therefore, 
this article explores the opportunity to construct a new, principled legal 
approach to respond to climate change that is premised on nationally 
derived legal responses.  To do so, this article considers the theoretical 
foundation of the international legal response to climate change – Hardin‟s 
„The Tragedy of the Commons‟ – and the systemic design faults of the 
Kyoto Protocol.  This article also suggests four principles – a judicious 
mix of legal instruments, flexibility, intrinsic legal coherence, and 
quantifiable and achievable targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
intensity – that are necessary to guide the creation of a nationally derived 
legal response to climate change.  This approach is intended to provide the 
catalyst for new bilateral and multilateral arrangements that can, with the 
passing of time, generate sufficient momentum to drive the creation of a 
new and effective cooperative international legal framework to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate change. 
The Kyoto Protocol
1
 is commonly portrayed as the most effective instrument to mitigate the 
challenges posed by anthropogenic climate change (“climate change”).  In truth, however, the 
design and ambitions of the Kyoto Protocol mean that it is incapable of providing the catalyst 
to reduce the impact of the activities that are the primary contributors to climate change.
2
  If 
the current international legal regime governing the global atmospheric commons is 
incapable of successfully mitigating climate change, then what type of legal regime should 
replace it?  This is the central question to which this article responds.  This article contends 
that the design failures of the international climate change law regime indicate that this 
regime must be replaced by a new legal approach that gains its momentum from the unilateral 
efforts initiated by nation-states.  This approach allows nation-states to develop their own 
jurisdiction-specific responses to climate change without having to operate within a 
prohibitively broad consensus-based legal model that seeks to align the views of a disparate 
body of nations.  By adopting this approach, nation-states can then use their domestic 
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experience to generate momentum for multilateral arrangements that, over time, can provide 
the catalyst for a new international regime. 
The central proposition of this article is explored over two sections.  Section one considers 
the dominant view among climate change scholars that climate change is a global problem 
that must be addressed using a global response.  Part (a) of section one reviews the theoretical 
basis underpinning the support for international action on climate change – Hardin‟s „The 
Tragedy of the Commons‟.3  Part (a) then moves to consider the dominant regulatory 
responses developed to overcome Hardin‟s tragedy.   
Part (b) of the first section assesses the major shortcomings of the current international 
climate change law regime.  This analysis concludes that the shortcomings of the Kyoto 
Protocol render it incapable of delivering the economic, societal and environmental changes 
required to mitigate climate change.   
Part (c) of this section considers the characteristics that make nation-states suitable to lead the 
transition to a low-emissions economy. 
Section two of this article considers the underlying legal principles that must inform national 
legal regimes that address climate change.  The purpose of identifying these principles is not 
to prescribe the specific structure and design of the national legal arrangements.  Rather, it is 
to draw attention to the principles that must permeate the new national legal arrangements for 
them to mitigate climate change. 
Throughout this article, examples are drawn from the electricity generation sector (“the 
electricity sector”) to provide practical applications of the otherwise theoretical foundations 
of this article‟s contention.  The electricity sector has been chosen because it is currently the 
largest global sectoral emitter, contributing approximately 32 per cent of global 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (“greenhouse gas emissions”).4  Further, without 
significant modifications to the fuels and technologies used to generate electricity, the 
growing demand for electricity will increase this sector‟s contribution to climate change.5  
For these reasons, the electricity sector is central to any effort to mitigate the problem of 
climate change. 
While this article draws on examples from the electricity sector, it is important to recognise 
that no single economic sector is capable of offering a solution to the problem of climate 
change.  Put differently, significant economy-wide efforts remain necessary to avoid the 
dangerous tipping points that scientists contend will occur without effective and timely 
mitigation of this problem.
6
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I  A GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
A  The Theoretical Basis: ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ 
 
The theoretical basis underpinning the global response to climate change is premised on 
Garrett Hardin‟s seminal piece „The Tragedy of the Commons‟.7  The central thesis posited 
by Hardin is that common or „open access‟ resources – which Hardin refers to as the 
commons – are overexploited and, as a result, destroyed.8 
Hardin explains the tragedy of the commons by considering the oft-cited hypothetical in 
which a “pasture [which, in this scenario, is the open access resource] is open to all [and 
where] ... each herdsman, will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons”.9  
Hardin notes that “[a]s a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain”10 by 
placing more cattle on the common property because, by doing so, he receives a direct benefit 
but is only liable for a fraction of the costs attributable to the overgrazing of the land.  
Eventually, a tragedy occurs because the pasture is depleted as a result of the self-interest 
pursued by each herder, whose activities remain unrestricted by government regulation.
11
 
Climate change scholars regard the rationale underpinning Hardin‟s tragedy of the commons 
as an apt analogy for the problem of climate change.
12
  In this scenario, the earth‟s 
atmosphere is the global common that, without government intervention limiting access to 
this resource, remains unprotected.  It is now well settled that climate change is at least 
partially caused by human activities that emit greenhouse gases into the earth‟s atmosphere 
(including, for example, the combustion of fossil fuels to generate electricity).
13
  The tragedy 
in relation to the earth‟s atmosphere occurs because, without effective government 
intervention, no single emitter has an incentive to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.  The 
reason for this is, like Hardin‟s herdsmen, reducing these emissions from one‟s own plant 
only serves to reduce one‟s own benefits without appreciably preventing the despoliation of 
the earth‟s atmosphere.14  As a result, “this [self interest] leads inexorably to the degradation 
of the atmospheric commons”15 as the culmination of greenhouse gases in the earth‟s 
atmosphere causes severe global climatic changes.
16
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Following Hardin‟s „Tragedy of the Commons‟, most climate change scholars contend that 
an effective legal response to climate change must be proportionate to the problem.  On this 
basis, the global scope of the tragedy of the atmospheric commons requires a global response 
to ensure that all contributing „herdsmen‟ are engaged in the solution.17  Climate change 
scholars therefore regard unilateral or multilateral action as irrational because “free-riding 
problems plague unilateral or multilateral “solutions””18 to a global problem.  A further 
disincentive for individual state-based action is that 
nations will not benefit proportionately from greenhouse-gas abatement policies.  In fact, some 
countries ... might experience no benefits from control, since they actually stand to gain from 
global climate change.
19
 
While the majority of climate change scholars hold that a global response to climate change 
is the accepted course of action, they remain divided between the two dominant regulatory 
responses that have emerged to address the tragedy of the atmospheric commons: direct 
regulation and market-based regulation.
20
  Direct regulation imposes a rule that prescribes 
specifically how an entity must act in order to mitigate its contribution to climate change.
21
  
Despite historical support for this approach (which existed up until the mid-1980s), direct 
regulation is no longer regarded as the leading regulatory tool to address Hardin‟s tragedy 
because of the view that this approach is overly rigid and expensive.
22
 
Market-based mechanisms have therefore emerged as the more popular regulatory tool to 
address Hardin‟s tragedy.23  This approach “encourage[s] behaviour through market signals, 
rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or methods”.24  This 
can be achieved either through the imposition of a tax on greenhouse gas emissions
25
 or 
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through the creation of a market in tradeable greenhouse gas emission permits.
26
  Both of 
these approaches internalise the costs of greenhouse gas emissions
27
 for emitters and, as a 
result, encourage the reduction of these emissions. 
The global approach to the tragedy of the commons together with the reliance on a tradeable 
permit scheme inform the design of the international climate change legal arrangements 
created under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
28
 (“the 
UNFCCC”) and the Kyoto Protocol.  It is to these instruments, and in particular the Kyoto 
Protocol, to which this study now turns. 
B  The Inadequacy of the Modern International Climate Change Regime 
 
The birth of the modern day international climate change regime occurred in 1992 with the 
adoption of the UNFCCC.  The preamble to the UNFCCC notes that the “change in the 
earth‟s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind”29 and, as such, it 
is committed to “protect[ing] the climate system for present and future generations”.30 
In 1995, at the first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, the parties commenced 
negotiations to solidify the underlying principles advocated in this document and, more 
particularly, to agree on stringent greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for industrialised 
nations.  On the basis of these negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted on 11 December 
1997 by a unanimous vote of the UNFCCC signatory parties.  The Kyoto Protocol 
subsequently took effect on 16 February 2005 following the ratification by the Russian 
Federation in November 2004. 
The Kyoto Protocol is designed to achieve a five per cent reduction of global greenhouse gas 
emissions below 1990 levels during its first commitment period, which began in 2008 and 
which ends in 2012.
31
  The Kyoto Protocol also envisages further commitment periods 
beyond 2012.
32
  To achieve its primary objective, the Kyoto Protocol supports the use of 
three flexibility mechanisms – emissions trading, clean development mechanisms and joint 
implementation – which are intended to provide flexibility to parties to, among other things, 
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achieve their emission reduction targets at minimum cost.
33
  In addition, the Kyoto Protocol 
calls on its signatories to develop and implement domestic action to meets its obligations.
34
 
At first glance, the principles underpinning the international legal response to climate change 
appear well designed.  They address the problem of climate change through the forum of 
international law and so abide with the common view that the tragedy of the atmospheric 
commons requires a global solution.  Further, the flexibility mechanisms rely on market-
based mechanisms to privatise the atmospheric commons.  However, when the principles 
informing this legal regime are considered in more detail, it is evident that the current 
international legal response is not only inappropriate, but also ineffective. 
Before considering the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, it is important to note that the 
purpose of the following analysis is not to assess the greenhouse gas emission targets set by 
this instrument nor is it to consider whether developed (or, as they are defined in the Kyoto 
Protocol, Annex I) countries are likely to meet these targets during the first commitment 
period.  Rather, the purpose of this analysis is to consider the foundational principles of the 
Kyoto Protocol.  In doing this, it becomes evident that the design of this legal instrument is 
incapable of decarbonising the global economy. 
There are three key evaluative criteria that can assist us to understand the magnitude of the 
shortcomings of the international climate change regime.
35
  The first criterion relates to 
whether the full extent of the problem is accurately defined.
36
  This is the most critical of the 
three criteria because a failure to identify the problem is likely to result in a misdiagnosis of 
the problem and, therefore, deliver misinformed responses.
37
  The second criterion requires 
clear and precise action to be taken in response to the identified source of the problem.
38
  The 
third criterion requires a consideration of whether the treaty is able to have a beneficial and 
practical impact on the source of the problem.
39
 
By applying the first two criteria to the Kyoto Protocol, it is evident that this instrument 
“offers the wrong diagnosis”40 as it “treats the symptoms [being greenhouse gas emissions] 
and not the cause [being the activities that cause greenhouse gas emissions]”.41  Therefore, 
this legal instrument does not offer a suitable solution to the real cause of the problem.  This 
distinction is subtle and is worth exploring in more detail. 
As this article has already stated, climate change occurs as a result of the activities that 
produce greenhouse gas emissions.  Logically it must follow therefore that a response to this 
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problem must be designed to address these underlying activities, rather than be concerned 
with the emissions themselves.  It is for this reason that the Kyoto Protocol would have been 
more effective if its founders had considered and addressed the reasons why greenhouse gas 
emissions are produced.
42
  By doing this, the Kyoto Protocol could have had as its central 
principle the development of laws and policies for securing low-emissions technologies to 
replace the existing emissions-intensive fossil fuel-sourced technologies.
43
  However, with its 
current design, the Kyoto Protocol is impotent to shift the “world‟s energy base to renewable 
power in lieu of fossil-fuel-fired power resources”44 because it has misdirected its focus 
towards the symptoms and not the cause of climate change.
45
 
The second fundamental flaw of the Kyoto Protocol – which goes to the third criterion – is 
that this legal framework seeks to engage all of the world‟s governments in order to achieve 
meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.  While the majority of climate change 
scholars support Hardin‟s global approach, Prins and Rayner note that the design of the 
current international legal regime “has the ring of idealistic symmetry”.46  In reality, this 
approach means that the “more parties there are to a negotiation, the lower the common 
denominator for [an effective] agreement”47 which means that the beneficial and practical 
impacts of the Kyoto Protocol are limited.  This shortcoming is explored further in the 
context of global participation under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries are generally required to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions by five to 10 per cent below 1990 levels during the first 
commitment period.  Developing countries, on the other hand, have no such obligation.
48
  
The rationale for this is that developed countries have historically been the beneficiaries of 
the activities that have contributed to climate change and therefore should carry the burden of 
mitigating the problem to which they were the largest contributors.  While this approach does 
have some merit, the IEA projects that 
nearly all of the growth in global emissions ... comes from outside of the OECD [Annex I 
countries].  Emissions from non-OECD [non-Annex I countries] countries grow from 15 Gt 
[carbon dioxide] in 2007 to 42 Gt [carbon dioxide] in 2050.  OECD emissions grow from 14 Gt 
[carbon dioxide] to 15 Gt [carbon dioxide during the same time].
49
 
As a result, the failure to impose specific obligations on developing countries and, more 
importantly, specifically engage them in the process of responding to climate change, renders 
the Kyoto Protocol useless as a long-term global solution to this problem.
50
  The problem of 
broad international engagement is further compounded by the refusal of the United States of 
America, one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gas emissions, to participate in the Kyoto 
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Protocol.
51
  Together these problems lend weight to the view that the Kyoto Protocol is 
incapable of adequately responding to the problem of climate change.  Adopting the language 
first used by Hardin, Engel posits that these failures mean that “the herders in Hardin‟s 
parable have agreed to abide by collectively established limits on herd size, but the biggest 
herder[s] of all [have] refused to participate”.52 
The shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol have resulted in an instrument that is incapable of 
effectively mitigating climate change.  Further, the failure of the Kyoto Protocol to engage 
„the biggest herders‟ means that this response to Hardin‟s tragedy is not a true international 
response and, therefore, does not effectively address the tragedy of the atmospheric 
commons. 
The failures of the Kyoto Protocol raise the question that was first asked in this article‟s 
introduction: if the design of the current international legal regime is unable to mitigate 
climate change effectively, what type of legal regime should replace it?  The following 
section responds to this question by submitting that nation-states must exert their sovereign 
powers to mitigate climate change that, over time, can provide the catalyst for a new multi-
national response to this problem.
53
 
C  The Role of National Legal Regimes to Respond to Climate Change 
 
The shortcomings of the international climate change regime mean a new strategy is required 
– one that emerges from the exercise of a nation state‟s sovereign powers – to manage the 
problem of the global atmospheric commons.
54
  Supra-national, national and sub-national 
actors such as the European Union, the United Kingdom and California have, for some time, 
been developing regulation to respond to the problem of climate change that extends beyond 
the scope of the international climate change regime.  By doing so, these jurisdictions have 
triggered action (or, in the case of California, support for action) at “higher jurisdictional 
levels of government encompassing a larger geographic scope”.55 
The following paragraphs consider examples of the sovereign power of nation-states that can 
provide the catalyst for the emergence of a new approach to managing climate change which 
emerges from the bottom-up.
56
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A nation-state (and, more particularly, a national government) is capable of providing the 
catalyst to manage effectively the responses to climate change because 
it owns and manages a significant number of assets ...; its programs affect the ability of others to 
adapt; it is an important provider of technical, fiscal, and other support; and it plays a crucial role 
in dealing with impacts that cross geographic or jurisdictional boundaries.
57
 
While these four reasons form the basis of national responses to climate change, it is 
important to consider, by way of two prominent examples, the different ways in which these 
factors can affect the role of national governments to mitigate this problem. 
One such example is the power of national governments to remove market barriers and, more 
particularly, subsidies that create distortive price signals, resulting in barriers to entry for 
renewable energy technologies.
58
  By removing these barriers, which are common in both 
developed and developing economies, existing market distortions favouring the use of 
emissions-intensive fuels for electricity, for example, could be removed.
59
  Taking this action 
would be a substantial step in overcoming the cost disparity between fossil fuel-sourced and 
renewable-sourced electricity. 
A further example of the power that national governments have in mitigating climate change 
is the role they can play in addressing cross-jurisdictional issues.  Take Australia, for 
example, in which each state and territory has implemented a small-scale feed-in tariff to 
support the dissemination of renewable energy technologies.
60
  If the federal government 
adopted a national market-based approach to encourage the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies, it would deliver to participants a larger, uniform and more competitive market 
to support the dissemination of small-scale renewable energy technologies.
61
 
National governments must therefore recognise that they are capable of utilising their 
sovereign powers to develop an appropriate legal approach to mitigate climate change.  By 
doing so, they can then begin to develop a national approach to mitigate climate change 
which can provide the catalyst for bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements which extend 
beyond the scope of their national programs.  However, until nation-states take ownership of 
the response to climate change, it is unlikely that an international legal response will progress 
beyond a theoretically ideal approach that fails in practice. 
II  PRINCIPLES REQUIRED TO DEVELOP AN APPROPRIATE NATIONAL RESPONSE TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
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For national regimes to create an effective legal response to climate change, each of these 
emerging national regimes must be crafted according to a set of consistent legal principles.  
On this basis, this section considers the following four key principles that are required to 
guide the emergence of a new climate change legal model: (i) a set of strategically selected 
legal instruments; (ii) flexibility; (iii) intrinsic legal coherence; and (iv) quantifiable and 
achievable targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas intensity.  These principles operate to 
inform the specific national legal arrangements that are developed to mitigate climate change.  
They are therefore not designed to prescribe exact formulations of laws that can be applied 
readily. 
The first, and arguably most important, principle for the design of an effective climate change 
legal framework is that it relies on a combination of strategically selected instruments that 
specifically target the problem sought to be overcome.
62
  By utilising a combination of 
instruments – including both prescriptive and market-based forms of regulation – the newly-
designed legal framework can address the central problem that the Kyoto Protocol has failed 
to solve in the most flexible, direct, predictable and cost-effective manner.
63
  The 
combination of prescriptive and market-based regulation provides a useful counterbalance as 
prescriptive “regulation [contributes] the virtues of high dependability and predictability”64 
while economic instruments ensure efficiency.  An example drawn from the Australian 
electricity context indicates how a single legal instrument is incapable of achieving the 
required levels of mitigation to respond to the problem of climate change. 
In 2000, the federal government introduced the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
(“MRET”) scheme.  This scheme remains the only national legal approach in Australia to 
reduce the electricity sector‟s contribution to climate change.65  The purpose of the MRET 
scheme was to impose a mandatory obligation on electricity retailers to “source an additional 
2 per cent of their electricity from renewable ... sources by 2010”.66  In 2009, the federal 
government amended this scheme (which at the same time was renamed the Renewable 
Energy Target (“RET”) scheme) to ensure that 20 per cent of Australia's electricity supply is 
generated from renewable energy sources by 2020.
67
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Under the RET scheme, total renewable energy generation is projected to reach 66,000 GWh 
in 2020, up from 27,000 GWh in 2010.
68
  On the basis of these projections, renewable 
electricity is expected to contribute approximately 22 per cent of Australia‟s total electricity 
generation in 2020.
69
  Translating this into greenhouse gas emissions, the federal government 
projects that by 2020 this scheme will reduce Australia‟s total emissions by approximately 35 
Mt from 2000 levels.
70
  However, for Australia to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25 
per cent from 2000 levels by 2020 (which agreement is conditional on a binding global 
agreement) Australia must eliminate a total of 255 Mt of greenhouse gas emissions.
71
  The 
projected emission reductions resulting from the RET scheme will only constitute 14 per cent 
of that total. Given that the electricity sector contributes approximately 35 per cent of 
Australia‟s current greenhouse gas emissions,72 a 14 per cent contribution to Australia‟s 
reduction commitment is substantially less than the electricity sector‟s contribution to 
Australia‟s overall greenhouse gas emissions profile.73 
Further, even if Australia does not increase its commitment beyond a five per cent reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 from 2000 levels, Australia must still eliminate a total 
of 144 Mt of greenhouse gas emissions. The projected emission cuts resulting from the RET 
scheme will constitute only 24 per cent of that total. Even this figure remains 
disproportionate to the electricity sector‟s contribution to Australia‟s greenhouse gas 
emissions profile.  On this basis, Australia is more likely to decarbonise its electricity sector 
by using multiple and complementary legal instruments that collectively shift Australia‟s 
electricity sector to a lower emissions base. 
A major challenge to the use of multiple instruments is that it can create a level of regulatory 
“smorgasbordism”.74  Therefore, the second key principle to consider is that when choosing 
the regulatory instruments it is critical to maintain intrinsic legal coherence.  This means that 
the chosen mix of regulatory instruments must be complementary, or at least capable of 
coexisting with one another, in order to create an effective climate change legal model.  
Intrinsic legal coherence also requires that the new legal framework is effectively integrated 
with the established legal arrangements.  Integration with existing laws is critical because the 
new legal framework cannot operate effectively without interacting and coexisting with a 
range of established and emerging legal rules relating to, among others things, property law, 
securities law, trade practices law, environmental law and planning and resources law. 
International integration is also a critical component for an effective legal framework that is 
capable of addressing the problem of climate change.  By designing a legal framework that 
has the flexibility to integrate and co-exist with foreign legal arrangements, it means that the 
national legal framework can support multilateral and, in the long-term, international 
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approaches to mitigate climate change.  Therefore, for these national initiatives to be 
effective they must not only operate effectively within the confines of the established 
domestic legal framework, they must also be able to interact and support other foreign 
domestic regimes that have similar objectives. 
The third core design principle is flexibility.  Flexibility allows the legal framework to 
respond to the evolving discipline of climate change science and the developing knowledge 
relating to technological responses to climate change.
75
  While it is well settled that human 
behaviour is at least partially responsible for increased global temperatures,
76
 questions 
relating to climate sensitivity (the direct relationship of the earth‟s temperature with the 
concentration of greenhouse gas emissions),
77
 the consequences of projected climate 
change,
78
 and the suggested actions to avoid these dangerous consequences remain 
unresolved.
79
  As a result, the design of a legal regime to mitigate climate change must be 
sufficiently flexible to respond to new scientific information that can inform the development 
of a new legal regime. 
Like science, an understanding of technologies capable of mitigating climate change 
continues to evolve.  This means that a legal regime that seeks to address this issue must 
factor in the capabilities and limitations of current and commercially deployable 
technology.
80
  For instance, Australia‟s renewable electricity scheme permits a large number 
of sources to participate in this scheme.
81
  By providing a wide eligibility net, the Australian 
renewable electricity scheme supports not only the technologies that are currently regarded as 
dominant (such as solar, hydro and wind), but it also encourages the participation (and 
development) of non-dominant technologies.  Further, the underlying legislation in Australia 
specifically contemplates that the list of eligible renewable electricity sources can be 
changed.  Together, the broad scope for eligibility combined with the design flexibility to 
include new technologies indicates that this scheme is sufficiently flexible to be able to 
respond to technological and scientific developments. 
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Finally, an appropriately designed legal framework to mitigate climate change must set 
quantifiable and achievable targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas intensity.
82
  These 
targets must comply with the available technological capabilities and correspond with 
scientifically determined environmental objectives.
83
 
Choosing to use greenhouse gas intensity as the environmental benchmark is necessary 
because, by doing so, it targets the emission-intensive fuels and technologies that contribute 
to climate change and not merely the greenhouse gases emitted following combustion of 
these fuels.
84
  Contrary to the Kyoto Protocol, this approach recognises that the human 
activities that produce greenhouse gas emissions are the cause of climate change that must be 
replaced by low-emission-intensity technologies.  For this reason, when setting the target for 
greenhouse gas intensity, it must be sufficiently stringent to ensure that existing emissions-
intensive technologies are replaced by technologies that are more efficient. 
A legal response to the problem of climate change which is premised on these four principles 
– a judicious combination of legal instruments, flexibility, legal coherence and quantifiable 
and pragmatic reductions of greenhouse gas intensity – provides the legal foundation for a 
new national legal model to effectively mitigate climate change.  The principles have been 
deliberately designed to remain malleable while, at the same time, immune from jurisdiction-
specific issues.  By using these four key principles as the base from which to construct a new 
national legal framework to replace the Kyoto Protocol, emerging national legal regimes will 
immediately share a degree of consistency which is likely to make the long-term objective of 
developing a new global framework developed from the bottom-up more achievable. 
III  CONCLUSION 
 
The application of Hardin‟s tragedy of the commons to the problem of climate change 
presupposes that the only effective response to this problem requires a global solution.  It is 
on this basis that the Kyoto Protocol was designed.  While the theoretical foundations for 
global action on which the Kyoto Protocol is premised are sound, the execution is misguided.  
As a result, this instrument is incapable of mitigating climate change.  This article has 
proposed a new legal regime that emerges from the bottom-up, rather than one which is 
imposed from the top down.  By doing so, nation-states can rely on their sovereign powers to 
provide the catalyst for the construction of a new and effective legal response to this problem. 
While national action to mitigate climate change does not strictly adhere to the principles 
propounded by Hardin, this approach provides the autonomy and flexibility for nation-states 
to develop legal responses that reflect their jurisdictional particularities.  By doing so, these 
national legal regimes can provide the momentum for legal responses which encompass a 
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broader jurisdictional scope and which, over time, can trigger an international response to 
mitigate climate change.  The purpose of this article, therefore, has not been to denigrate the 
concept of cooperative and global action as a response to climate change, as this type of 
approach remains the optimal solution.  Rather, this article‟s purpose has been to suggest a 
new principled approach to deliver an effective global response to the problem of climate 
change that emerges from the bottom-up. 
The second section of this article explored the four core principles that must underpin any 
national effort to mitigate climate change.  These principles, while providing autonomy and 
flexibility to individual jurisdictions, ensure that the emerging national legal regimes respond 
to climate change in a consistent manner.  It is important to recognise that these principles are 
not exhaustive as there may be other factors relevant to the needs of individual jurisdictions.  
However, by providing a list of core legal principles it provides a useful starting point from 
which to construct a national, and ultimately international, legal response to climate change. 
 
